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I. INTRODUCTION

Consider the following hypothetical: You have, in disregard of your better judgment, decided to purchase a small quantity of illegal drugs for personal
use. To make this purchase you place a call on your cellular phone or send a
text message to the local drug dealer. Unfortunately for you, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation ("FBI") has been investigating this particular drug dealer and
has, in the course of this investigation, placed a wiretap on the drug dealer's
phone to monitor its communications. Based on information obtained from the
cell phone wiretap on the drug dealer's phone, you are arrested by the FBI. You
ultimately concede the purchase, but maintain that the drugs were strictly for
personal use. Nevertheless you are charged with a felony-grade violation of 21
U.S.C.A § 843(b). This statute prohibits the knowing or intentional use of "any

1023
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communication facility in committing or in causing or facilitating the commission of' an illegal narcotic distribution in the United States. 1 Recalling an experience of an acquaintance who was charged in California, you know that in that
state the purchase of drugs for personal use, or possession for personal use, constitutes only a misdemeanor and is punishable by a maximum sentence of one
year imprisonment, a minimum $1,000 fine or both.2 However, you have not
been charged in California but rather in Morgantown, West Virginia. Because
you are being charged in a different jurisdiction, your misdemeanor purchase
has been elevated to a felony drug charge which is punishable by up to four
years of incarceration in federal prison, a fine under Title 18, or both.3 Unlike
the Ninth Circuit federal courts in California, the Fourth Circuit courts in West
Virginia had previously held that, pursuant to § 843(b), your intent to limit to
personal use has no bearing on the issue of whether you facilitated the commission of the illegal narcotic distribution. Merely by purchasing the narcotics with
the aid of a communication facility, you had, according to the Fourth Circuit,
facilitated the sale of the drugs to yourself and were thus guilty of a felony
which carries with it a significantly harsher penalty.
This hypothetical was, in fact, quite real for many who purchased drugs
for personal use across the country until very recently. In the April 2008 case of
United States v. Abuelhawa, the Fourth Circuit held that when persons facilitate
the distribution of a controlled substance to themselves for personal use by using a communication facility they can be prosecuted for violating § 843(b).4 In
deciding Abuelhawa, the court highlighted a split among the U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals regarding the interpretation of this statute. While this split had been
developing over the last twenty-five years, with several cases on both sides, the
United States Supreme Court chose not to resolve the disagreement among the
circuits until the spring of 2009. After the decision by the Fourth Circuit in
April of 2008, Mr. Abuelhawa applied for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court. Certiorari was granted in November 2008. 5 While the Supreme Court
had refused to address this issue several times in the past 6, its recent decision
has definitively asserted the Court's stance on the difference between misdemeanor and felony drug facilitation.
This Note will examine how this split among the federal circuit courts
regarding the interpretation of whether § 843(b) extends to a defendant's use of
1

21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (2003).

2

21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2003).

3

21 U.S.C. § 843(d).

523 F.3d 415, 421 (4th Cir. 2008).
Abuelhawa v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 593, 172 L.Ed.2d 452, 77 USLW 3100, 77 USLW
3292, 77 USLW 3295, 08 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 14,210 (U.S. Nov 14, 2008).
6
See United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971. 1032 (5th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 457 U.S.
1136, 459 U.S. 906 (1982); United States v. Watson, 594 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1979). cert. denied,
444 U.S. 840, 100 S.Ct. 78, 62 L.Ed.2d 51 (1979).
4

5
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a communication facility in causing or facilitating a felony drug distribution
when the defendant is purchasing drugs for personal use was resolved. Part II of
this Note examines the foundations of the circuit split. Part II.A will present the
circuits that have argued that § 843(b) is violated when drugs are purchased for
personal use. Part II.B will present the circuits that have argued that the statute
is not violated when the drugs are purchased for personal use. Part II.C will
examine the circuits that have looked at facilitation and personal use but have
not directly ruled on the issue. Part III will detail the decision recently handed
down by the Supreme Court. Part IV will look at, by discussing several issues,
why the Supreme Court found that § 843(b) is not violated by the use of a communication device when drugs are purchased for personal use. Part A will examine how the Supreme Court has previously interpreted statutory language and
how this interpretation aided their decision in Abuelhawa. Part B will explore
the stated Congressional purpose of the enacted drug laws and how this intent
likely influenced the Court's decision-making process. Part V will evaluate
several analogous Supreme Court cases that, while not mentioned in the decision, shed light on how the Court likely analyzed Abuelhawa. Part VI will examine why the issue was and should be of great importance to prosecutors and
defense attorneys alike. Part VII will look at three other policy arguments that
likely counseled the Supreme Court against finding for the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of Abuelhawa. Part VIII will discuss two recently decided cases
that may have been considered by the Court and emphasizes their significance.
This Note will conclude in Part IX by arguing that the Court made the correct
decision in finding that § 843(b) is not violated by the use of a communication
device when drugs are purchased for personal use.
II.
A.

FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT

CircuitsPreviously Holding § 843(b) was Violated When Drugs Were
Purchasedfor Personal Use

Prior to the Supreme Court's ruling, the most recent case to hold that
the use of a communication facility to buy drugs for personal use does facilitate
the commission of a drug felony in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 843(b) was the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal's ruling in U.S. v. Abuelhawa. In Abuelhawa,
the court affirmed the district court conviction of the defendant, Khade Abuelhawa.' Abuelhawa was charged with using a cellular telephone to arrange the
purchase of a small amount of drugs for his personal use from a drug dealer,
Mohammed Said. 8 Abuelhawa was later found guilty of using his phone to facilitate the commission of a drug "felony."' 9 Despite arguing that § 843(b) was not
7
8
9

United States v. Abuelhawa, 523 F.3d 415, 423 (4th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 417-18.
Id. at 421.
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violated "when an individual facilitates the purchase of a drug quantity for personal use," because the purchase of cocaine for personal use is a misdemeanor,
not a felony, the court rejected this argument by the defendant.' 0 The court
noted that the defendant did not dispute that he had, in fact, "used a communication facility (a cell phone) to arrange the drug transactions.""' Consequently, the
court reasoned that the case could be "decided by focusing only on whether Abuelhawa facilitated the commission of a felony."' 12 Relying on its precedential
view of statutory interpretation, the court gave the term "facilitate" its "common
meaning," which was, plainly, "to make easier or less difficult, or to assist or
aid." ' 3 Based upon this definition, the court found that Abuelhawa's "use of his
cell phone undoubtedly made Said's [defendant's drug dealer] cocaine distribution easier., 14 Because Said's sale of cocaine to Abuelhawa constituted a felony
under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 5 the court determined that the defendant's use of
his cell 16phone to help arrange the distribution fell squarely within the scope of §
843(b).
In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals stressed that "the statute does not specify whose felony must be at issue, just that 'a' felony must be
facilitated." 7 The court, therefore, found it "simply irrelevant" that the defendant's possession of cocaine for personal use was "not itself ... a felony."18 In
the court's view, Congress "may well have had reason" to impose this additional
punishment - escalating the punishment from simple misdemeanor possession
to felony distribution - upon personal-use defendants who use communication
facilities such as cell phones to arrange drug transactions. "[U]se of communication facilities makes it easier for criminals to engage in their skullduggery,
and Congress may reasonably have desired to increase criminal penalties for
those who use such means to evade detection by law enforcement."' 9 Because
of this inferred intent, the court found Abuelhawa's contention failed "to prove
that our result is 'demonstrably at odds,' 20 with congressional intent, best expressed in the plain language of § 843(b), which references only a 'felony.' 21
In its holding, the court made it quite clear that, in the Fourth Circuit, "status as
0

Id. at 419.

11

Id. at 420.
12
Id.
13
United States v. Abuelhawa, 523 F.3d 415. 420 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting U.S. v. Lozano,
839 F.2d 1020, 1023 (4th Cir. 1998)).
14
Id. at 421.
15
16
17
18

19

20
21

Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1)).
Id.

Id.
Id.
United States v. Abuelhawa, 523 F.3d 415, 420 (4th Cir. 2008).
Id. (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989)).
Id. at 421.
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buyer or distributor is of no consequence regarding § 843(b); rather
[a defen22
dant's] status as [a] facilitator alone gives rise to criminal liability.,
Even before its analysis in Abuelhawa, the Fourth Circuit had recognized that "our sister circuits are divided on the issue facing us. ' 23 While analyzing both sides of the split, the court ultimately sided with the "facilitation
camp" circuits that "concluded that distribution for personal use [is] covered by
§ 843(b). '24 One of the circuits that supported the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of § 843(b) was the Seventh Circuit. In United States v. Binkley, the Seventh Circuit held that the use of a telephone to purchase drugs for personal use
violated § 843(b).25 In the court's view, "it is not necessary to determine what a
defendant does with the cocaine he purchased in order to determine whether that
defendant violated § 843(b). 2 6 The court reasoned that "regardless of what
Binkley [the defendant] did with the cocaine after the sale" - i.e., whether he
distributed the drugs or used them personally - his telephone conversations
with Solomon, the drug dealer, "not only made Solomon's sale of cocaine (a
felony under Title II of the Act) easier, it made the sale possible., 27 The Seventh Circuit then concluded that the buyer's "subsequent treatment of the cocaine cannot retroactively diminish [his] previous facilitation of [the seller's]
cocaine sale.",28 This 2-1 decision of a panel 29of three judges in Binkley was
subsequently reaffirmed by the Seventh Circuit.
Four years after Binkley, the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Kozinski rejected the argument that individuals did not violate § 843(b) "if they were
using the telephone to purchase cocaine for their own use. ' 30 The court found
that "[d]istributing cocaine is [a] felony," and surmised that, if "by their use of
the telephone, the [defendants] have made the distribution of the cocaine easier,
they have facilitated it and violated the statute., 31 Thus, the court reasoned that
"a person who uses a telephone to assist the distribution of cocaine, and then
consumes the cocaine is as culpable as the one who uses the telephone to assist
the distribution, and then gives the cocaine to another to consume., 32 The court
22

Id. (quoting U.S. v. Kozinski, 16 F.3d 795, 807 (7th Cir. 1994)).

23

Id. at 420.

24

Id.

25

903 F.2d 1130, 1136 (7th Cir. 1990).

26

Id. at 1135 36.

27
28

Id. at 1136.
Id.

29

Id. at 1137-39 (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's rationale conflicted with

a long settled rule that a purchaser of drugs for personal use cannot be convicted of "facilitating

distribution to himself or herself"). Judge Cudahy also found that the majority's theory "makes no
sense" because, under its line of reasoning, "actual possession of one gram of cocaine would be a
misdemeanor," while "use of the telephone to obtain the cocaine would be a felony." Id.
30
United States v. Kozinski, 16 F.3d 795, 807 (7th Cir. 1994).
31

1

6]

Id.
32

Id.
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thus reaffirmed the holding in Binkley "that the buyer-seller defense has no effect on 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). 33
In addition to reliance upon the Seventh Circuit, the Fourth Circuit Abuelhawa court also looked to the Fifth Circuit for guidance. In United States v.
Phillips, a decision cited throughout Binkley, the Fifth Circuit found that in order to prove a violation of § 843(b), "the government must establish that the
defendant knowingly and intentionally used a communication facility, e.g., a
telephone, to facilitate the commission of a narcotics offense., 34 Accordingly,
"in order to establish the facilitation element, the government must show that
the telephone call comes within the common meaning of facilitate - 'to make
easier' or less difficult. ' 35 Thus, "it is sufficient if a defendant's use of a telephone to facilitate the possession or distribution of a controlled substance facilitates either his own or another person's possession or distribution., 36 Seemingly, the Fifth Circuit was persuaded that the focus should not be on whether the
defendant bought or sold the cocaine, but rather whether the use of a communication facility functioned to facilitate the distribution. While Phillips was not
directly on point, as it did not deal with a defendant who claimed that the drugs
were only for personal use, the decision did sharpen the issue for the Fourth
Circuit court in Abuelhawa. Additionally, this decision has been overruled on
other grounds unrelated to its discussion of facilitation. 37 Even with this rejection, the principles regarding facilitation were still good law and bound the Fifth
Circuit and, because of an unusual technicality, the Eleventh Circuit as well.38
In addition to the Seventh and Fifth circuits, the Abuelhawa court also
looked to several previous Fourth Circuit decisions dealing with facilitation and
distribution to develop its analysis. In United States v. Lozano, the court cited
Phillips' common meaning of facilitation to find that the defendant's telephone
call to inform his purchaser that he had arrived in Virginia to "handle the problem concerning the tainted cocaine" was sufficient to prove the facilitation component.39 Similarly, in United States v. Livas, the Fourth Circuit again turned to

33

Id.

34

664 F.2d 971. 1032 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (citing U.S. v. Rey, 641 F.2d 222, 224 n.6 (5th

Cir. 1981)).
Id. (quoting United States v. Watson, 594 F.2d 1330, 1343 (10th Cir. 1979)).
36
Id. (citing Watson, 594 F.2d at 1342, n. 14).
3
Id. (overruled on other grounds by United States v. Huntress, 956 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir.
35

1992)). The decision was overturned on procedural grounds with the court stating. "We emphasize
again that district judges should follow Rule 23(b) - that is, they should decide whether to proceed with an 11-person jury or retry the defendant - rather than substitute an alternate juror
under the procedure approved of in United States v. Phillips." Id. at 1319.
8
See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415. 1422 n.8 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting
that all cases decided by Unit B panels of the Former Fifth Circuit are binding precedent in the
Fifth Circuit); Stein v. Reynolds Sec. Inc., 667 F.2d 33, 34 (11 th Cir. 1982) (finding that decisions
by Unit B panels of the Former Fifth Circuit are binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit).
39
839 F.2d 1020, 1032 (4th Cir. 1988).
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the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Phillips to define the term facilitation and define the
components needed to prove a violation of § 843(b). 40 Like these previous cases, the question again came down to whether the defendant's use of a communication facility did, in fact, facilitate the drug offense. And like those previous
cases, the Rivas court found that "a prima facie case need not include proof that
the defendant committed the underlying offense, only that [he] facilitated its
commission. ,4 1 While neither Lozano nor Livas dealt with the issue of personal
use, both decisions frame the issue in the same way as all of the circuits on the
"facilitation" side of the split. With their interpretation of the language of §
843(b), these circuits presumably expected the Supreme Court to place less
weight on whether the defendant was guilty of selling narcotics as opposed to
merely purchasing narcotics for personal use, and greater, dispositive weight on
whether the defendant used a communication facility to facilitate the transaction.
B.

CircuitsPreviously Holding § 843(b) was Not Violated When Drugs
Were Purchasedfor Personal Use

In the lower court Abuelhawa decision, the Fourth Circuit candidly acknowledged that its interpretation of § 843(b) conflicted with the decisions of
several other courts of appeals. The Fourth Circuit explained that other circuits
favored an interpretation that "a mere customer's contribution to the business he
patronizes does not constitute the facilitation envisioned by Congress. 42 One of
the first circuits to recognize this distinction and place itself in the "personal use
camp" was the Ninth Circuit. In United States v. Martin, the Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction of a defendant who had been found guilty of violating 43§
843(b) based on his purchase of a small amount of cocaine for personal use.
The Ninth Circuit rejected the government's contention that a drug "conspiracy
is an ongoing enterprise . . . that buyers encourage and facilitate . . . through
their purchases," and instead agreed with the defendant's assertion that a "purchaser's relationship to the distribution conspiracy from which he buys is of
such a marginal nature that he cannot be considered a 'facilitator' within the
meaning of the statute.
Because of this, the court believed "a buyer cannot
facilitate the very sale which creates his status., 45 The court found no precedent
in case law to support the "position that the distribution of drugs or an agree-

41

867 F.2d 609 (Table) (4th Cir. 1989) (citing Lozano and Phillips).
Id. at 3.

42

United States v. Abuelhawa, 523 F.3d 415, 420 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v.

40

Martin, 599 F.2d 880, 889 (9th Cir. 1979)).

43

599 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1979), overruled on other grounds by U.S. v. DeBright, 730 F.2d
1255 (9th Cir. 1984).
44
Id.at 888.
45

Id.
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ment to distribute drugs is 'facilitated' by a purchaser of the drugs.

46

Rather, in

each case in which the court had "upheld a conviction of facilitation, the defendant's role in the distribution of drugs has been far more substantial than that of
a buyer for personal consumption. ' 4 ' Thus, the intent of the defendant and the
amount of drugs in question were important considerations for the court in its
interpretation.
In explaining its holding, the Ninth Circuit pointed to the legislative history of Congress's Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1973 (the "Act").4 8 In the judgment of the court, the Act illustrated Congress's
intent with federal drug laws "to draw a sharp distinction between distributors
and simple possessors, both in the categorization of substantive crimes and in
the resultant penalties., 49 The Ninth Circuit court felt that to hold "persons who
merely buy drugs for their personal use ... on equal footing with distributors by

virtue of the facilitation statute would undermine this statutory distinction."5 0
Subsequent Ninth Circuit decisions have reaffirmed this line of thinking. In
United States v. Brown, the court stated that "the use of a telephone to order
cocaine for personal use is similarly not a lesser-included offense; indeed, it is
no offense at all." 51 Although "[s]ection 843(b) condemns the use of a telephone in facilitating the commission of certain felonies," the "[p]ossession of
cocaine for personal use is only a misdemeanor., 52 Further, in the court's view,
there was "no statute analogous to section 843(b)" that punished "the use of the
telephone to commit a misdemeanor," and, thus, the court would not rule as if
there were. 53

The Tenth Circuit also aligned itself with the decisions of the Ninth Circuit and concurred that the use of a telephone to purchase drugs for personal use
does not violate § 843(b). The court, in United States v. Baggett, rejected the
government's assertion that "one who uses a telephone to facilitate their simple
possession of a controlled substance transforms the crime into a felony. ' Instead the court found that the government's assertion did "not comport with the
legislative history of the statute" as the statute "clearly places mere 'customers'

46

47

Id.
Id.; see, e.g., Grimes et al. v. United States, 423 U.S. 996 (1975) (conspirator); United States

v. Padilla, 525 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1975) (conspirator/seller); United States v. Smith, 519 F.2d 516

(9th Cir. 1975) (conspirator); United States v. Turner, 528 F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1975) cert. denied
sub norn.; United States v. Veon, 474 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1973) (sellers).
48 United States v. Martin, 599 F.2d 880, 889 (9th Cir. 1979).
49
50

Id.
Id.

51

761 F.2d 1272, 1278 (9th Cir. 1985).

52

Id.

53

Id.

54

890 F.2d 1095, 1097 (10th Cir. 1989).
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in the misdemeanor category."55 Thus, "because [the defendant] used the telephone only to order drugs for personal use, a misdemeanor, she cannot be convicted under section 843(b)." 56 The court further distinguished the differences
between customers and sellers in rejecting the prosecution's reliance on a previous Tenth Circuit case which held that § 843(b) does not distinguish between
those who purchase for "further distribution as opposed to a [purchase] for personal consumption." 5 The court, finding the reliance on United States v. Watson "misplaced," distinguished Watson by noting that the result was reached
only "after concluding that 'there was proof that the appellants, as street dealers,
were using the telephone to obtain heroin or cocaine for resale."' 5 8 Since Watson involved "defendants whose underlying crime was a felony, not a misdemeanor," it bore little relation to Baggett and was thus not persuasive authority. 59 Finally, in United States v. Small, the Tenth Circuit later reaffirmed the
holding in Baggett "that § 843(b) is not violated when the drug distribution facilitated with the use of a telephone is solely for the purpose of personal consumption."6
C.

Uncertainty in the Sixth Circuit

Although prior to the Supreme Court decision, there were at least two
circuits solidly situated on each side of the split over the interpretation of §
843(b), there was also one circuit that had addressed the issue but could not be
placed squarely in either the facilitation or the personal use camp. In United
States v. Van Buren, the Sixth Circuit relied on the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Martin to hold that "evidence of the purchase of cocaine for personal use does
,,61
not establish use of the telephone to further the [drug distribution] conspiracy.
62
The court vacated the defendant's guilty plea under § 843(b). In spite of this
holding, the Fourth Circuit Abuelhawa court declined to follow Van Buren because the case involved the accusation that the defendant used a telephone to
facilitate a conspiracy to distribute cocaine, rather than to facilitate the distribution of cocaine itself.63 To make this distinction, the Abuelhawa court cited to a
previously-decided Sixth Circuit case, United States v. McLernon, which
55

Id. at 1097: see 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4566, 4577 ("illegal possession of
controlled drugs by an individual for [her] own use is a misdemeanor.").
56

Id. at 1098.

57 Id. (quoting United States v. Watson, 594 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840,
100 S. Ct. 78, 62 L.Ed.2d 51 (1979)).
58
Id. (quoting Watson, 594 F.2d at 1343).
59

Id. at 1098.

60

423 F.3d 1164, 1186 (10th Cir 2005).
804 F.2d 888, 892 (6th Cir. 1986).

61
62
63

Id.
United States v. Abuelhawa, 523 F.3d 415. 420 n.6 (4th Cir. 2008).
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adopted the same "common meaning of facilitation - 'to make easier"' language used in the Fifth and Seventh Circuits. 64 In McLernon, the Sixth Circuit
noted that "[i]t is sufficient if a defendant's use of a telephone to facilitate the
possession or distribution of controlled substances facilitates either his own or
another person's possession or distribution. ' 65 The court then held that § 843(b)
applied to the defendant who had used a telephone to facilitate the purchase of
66
10 kilograms of cocaine
However, the McLernon court reached this decision
in light of the facts that the defendant was acknowledged to be a drug dealer
who had used the telephone to facilitate the purchase of cocaine for further dis67
tribution. Because these conflicting Sixth Circuit cases are slightly different
than the facts in Abuelhawa, it was an open question as to how the Sixth Circuit
would rule if presented with the applicability of § 843(b) to the purchase of
drugs for personal use.

III. THE DECISION
In May 2009, the United States Supreme Court found unanimously that
the use of a telephone to make a misdemeanor drug purchase is not the use of a
communication facility in causing or "facilitating" another's commission of the
felony of drug distribution in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b).68 Writing for the
Court in one of his final opinions, Justice Souter noted several of the arguments
listed above in announcing the Court's decision. First, acknowledging that the
Government's argument was valid "on the literal plane," Justice Souter found
that the Government's interpretation of "'facilitate' sits uncomfortably with
common usage" because "a sale necessarily presupposes two parties with specific roles" - the buyer and the seller. 69 The "word 'facilitate' adds nothing" to
such transactions as a buyer does not facilitate a sale any more than a "borrower
facilitates a bank loan., 70 Rather, common usage "limits 'facilitate' to the efforts of someone other than a primary or necessary actor in the commission of a
substantive crime.'
Next, Justice Souter attacked the Government's argument that Congress
intended § 843 to "ratchet up the culpability of buyers" using cellular phones] 2
64

Id.

65

746 F.2d 1098, 1106 (6th Cir. 1984) (quoting United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1032

(5th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 457 U.S. 1136, 459 U.S. 906 (1982)).
66
Id. at 1106-07.
67

Id.

68

Abuelhawa v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 2102 (2009).

69

Id.

70

Id.

71

[d. at 2106.

72

Id.at 2105.
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Looking to the history and intent of Congress at the time the statute was passed,
Justice Souter found that "in these days when everyone over the age of three
seems to carry a cell phone, the Government's interpretation would skew the
calibration of penalties very substantially.",13 To the Court, Congress's message
was clear: "to treat purchasing drugs for personal use more leniently than the
felony of distributing drugs, and to narrow the scope of the communications
provision to cover only those who facilitate a drug felony.

74

Souter then found

that the Government's argument that "Abuelhawa's use of a phone in making
two small drug purchases would subject him, in fact, to six felony counts and a
potential sentence of twenty-four years in prison, even though buying the same
drugs minus the phone would have supported only two misdemeanor counts and
two years of prison" to be "impossible to believe. 75
Lastly, Justice Souter countered the Government's final argument that
the use of a phone was simply an aggravating factor designed to highlight culpable conduct by noting that although there was "no question that Congress intended § 843(b) to impede illicit drug transactions by penalizing the use of
communication devices," Congress did not intend to do so by exposing firsttime buyers to such excessively severe penalties.76 Finding the Government's
position 'just too unlikely," Justice Souter found that "Congress used no language spelling out a purpose so improbable, but legislated against a background
usage" of certain terms that pointed "in the opposite direction and [in] accords
with the CSA's choice to classify small purchases as misdemeanors. 7 7
IV.

BACKGROUND FACTORS UTILIZED BY THE SUPREME COURT TO FIND THAT

§ 843(b)

IS NOT VIOLATED BY THE USE OF A COMMUNICATION DEVICE FOR
MISDEMEANOR PURCHASES

A.

Use of Statutory Interpretation

In resolving this split among the circuits, the Supreme Court was
charged with determining whether § 843(b) extends to personal use. In its past
decisions, the Court has always emphasized that statutory interpretation must
"begin with the language of the statute. '
As stated in Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury, "statutory language cannot be construed in a vacuum. 79

"It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction," the Court declared, "that
73

Id]. at 2106.

74

Abuelhawa v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 2102, 2107 (2009).

75

Id.

76

Id.

77

Id.

78

Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002).

79

489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989).
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the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place
in the overall statutory scheme." 80 When there is ambiguity in the statute in
question, the analyzing court, as noted in the Abuelhawa decision, must first
"determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning
with regard to the particular dispute in the case." 81 If the meaning is clear then
the "inquiry must cease" because "the statutory language is unambiguous" and
'the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.', 8 2 However, if the language
of the statute is found by the court to be ambiguous, then the court must follow a
different analysis. As stated in United States v. Bass, the court has frequently
reaffirmed that "ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be
resolved in favor of lenity. ' 83 This is required because, "when a choice has to
be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is
appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress
should have spoken in language that is clear and definite." ,84 This analysis was
based upon two factors. First, it is necessary that "a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the
law intends to do if a certain line is passed." 85 The second factor is that "legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity. 86 These fundamental principles underscore the sound public policy of an "instinctive distaste[s] against
men languishing in prison unless the lawmaker has clearly said that they

80

Id.; see United States v.Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984) ("We do not, however, construe

statutory phrases in isolation; we read statutes as a whole.").
8I United States v. Abuelhawa, 523 F.3d 415. 419 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Robinson v. Shell
Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340, 117 S. Ct. 843. 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997)).
82
Id. at 419 (citing Robinson, 519 U.S. at 340 (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc.,
489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989))).
83
404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971); see Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971); see also
Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 177 (1958); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955);
United States v. Five Gambling Devices, etc.. 346 U.S. 441 (1953) (plurality opinion for affirmance).
84
404 U.S. at 347 (quoting United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 22122 (1952)).
85 Id. at 348 (quoting McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931)); see also United
States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174 (1952) (finding in relation to a criminal provision of the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act that:
The vice of vagueness in criminal statutes is the treachery they conceal either
in determining what persons are included or what acts are prohibited. Words
which are vague and fluid may be as much of a trap for the innocent as the ancient laws of Caligula. We cannot sanction taking a man by the heels for refusing to grant the permission which this Act on its face apparently gave him
the right to withhold. That would be making an act criminal without fair and
effective notice.
Id. at 176-77).
86

Id.
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should." 8 Thus, where there is ambiguity in a criminal statute, the "tie must go
to the defendant" as "the rule of lenity requires ambiguous criminal laws to be
interpreted in favor of the defendants subjected to them." 88
Abuelhawa both highlighted and provided an opportunity for the Supreme Court to resolve a contentious ambiguity in a fair and just manner. Several circuits had ruled on this issue and, through these rulings, had failed to provide clarity and uniformity. Much of the ambiguity centered on the term "facilitate." Prior to the decision of the Court, the terms of the statute made it unlawful to use a telephone or other communication device to "facilitate" the commission of a drug "felony." 89 However, in spite of the Fourth Circuit's definition of
facilitation as meaning to make easier, it is equally reasonable and more fundamentally fair to find that a person who uses a telephone to purchase drugs for
personal use does not actually "facilitate" a drug "felony." First, "facilitate", as
it is used in § 843(b), should be interpreted in the context of the traditional rule
that a person who buys an illegal product is not guilty of aiding or abetting that
sale. 90 This traditional rule has long provided that "a purchaser is not a party to
the crime of an illegal sale" 9' and has even been codified in the Model Penal
Code definition stating that "a person is not an accomplice in an offense committed by another person if ...the offense is so defined that his conduct is inevitably incident to its commission ....
Following this line of reasoning, it
seems logical that a buyer of drugs cannot be convicted of aiding and abetting
his dealer's sale of drugs to him. 93 As noted by the Abuelhawa court, the terms
"aid and abet" and "facilitate" are synonymous with each other. In fact, in its
definition of "aid and abet," Black's Law Dictionary reads "to assist or facilitate
the commission of a crime. 94 Accordingly, just as a purchaser of narcotics for
personal use cannot be convicted of "aiding and abetting" the distribution of the

Id. (quoting H. Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter & the Reading of Statutes, in BENCHMARKS
196, 209 (1967)).
88
United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2025 (2008).
89
21 U.S.C. § 843(b).
90
Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 119 (1932) (purchaser of illegal liquor does not aid
or abet that sale).
9'
2 WAYNE R. LEFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMiNAL LAW, § 13.3(e) (2d ed. 2003); see United
States v. Farrar, 281 U.S. 624 (1930): State v. Cota, 956 P.2d 507 (Ariz. 1998): State v. Celestine.
671 So.2d 896 (La. 1996); State v. Utterback, 485 N.W.2d 760 (Neb. 1992); Robinson v. State,
815 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. 1991) (collecting cases from other jurisdictions); Wilson v. State, 196 S.W.
87

921 (Ark. 1917); Wakeman v. Chambers, 28 N.W. 498 (Iowa 1886).
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(6)(b) (2001).

92

See United States v. Swiderski, 548 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1977) (rejecting the government's
suggestion that the defendant who obtained drugs for personal use "would nevertheless be liable
as an aider and abettor of the agent's distribution to him" because "this would totally undermine

93

the statutory scheme. Its effect would be to write out of the Act the offense of simple possession,

since under such a theory every drug abuser would be liable for aiding and abetting the distribution which led to his possession." Id. at 451.).
94

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

59 (8th ed. 2004).
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narcotics to himself, it stands to reason that he also cannot be convicted of "facilitating" the distribution of narcotics to himself.
B.

CongressionalPurpose

In addition to examining the construction of the actual language of the
statute, it was also necessary, because of the ambiguity in the plain text of the
statute, for the Supreme Court to look to the Congressional intent and purpose
behind the statute. This includes considering both the entire statute and other
statutes surrounding it. The Supreme Court has repeatedly announced that it is
"a 'fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must
be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory
scheme.' 95 A court must therefore interpret the statute 'as a symmetrical and
coherent regulatory scheme"', 96 and "fit, if possible, all parts into an harmonious
whole." 97 As seen in the opinion, it is clear that the Court found that § 843(b)
was a smaller part of a comprehensive drug enforcement plan in which Congress "intended to draw a sharp distinction between [drug] distributors and simple possessors .... ,98 Viewed against the backdrop of legislative history and
subsequent passage of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act of 1971 (the "Act"), it is apparent that § 843(b) was never intended to affect
those who purchase drugs solely for personal use.
Prior to enactment of the Act in 1970, the mere purchase or possession
of drugs in small amounts for personal use could result in a felony conviction
and severe penalties. 99 In this previous version, all categories of drug users
were classified in the same category. Thus, petty drug users were not distinguished from large-scale drug distributors, and all were subject to the same
harsh punishments. In response to that unreasonable construction, Congress
completely rebuilt the U.S. Code dealing with drug control. With the passage of
the Act, Congress chose to distinguish between "(1) participation in a continuing enterprise, (2) possession with intent to distribute, and (3) simple possession
.... ,100 With these significant changes, Congress implemented the recommendations of President Kennedy's "Advisory Committee on Narcotic and Drug
Abuse ... , which proposed stringent measures against the evils of drug traffic
Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)
(quoting Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)).
96
Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 569 (1995).
95

97
98

Id. (quoting FTC v. Mandel Brothers, Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 389 (1959)).
United States v. Martin, 599 F.2d 880, 889 (9th Cir. 1979).

See, e.g.. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 591. ch. 736 § 4704(a). 68A Stat. 550
(originally codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a)); Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act of 1909. Pub.
L. No. 221, ch. 100 § 2. 35 Stat 614 (originally codified at 21 U.S.C. § 174) (all repealed by the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513 §§
99

101(a)(2), (b)(3)(A), 84 Stat. 1236, 1291-92).

100 United States v. Swiderski, 548 F.2d 445, 449 (2d Cir. 1977).
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and rehabilitation rather than retribution in the case of personal drug abuse."'' 1
As noted in the House Report on the proposed Act, "[p]ossession of controlled
drugs is made a misdemeanor, except where the possession is for the purpose of
distribution to others."' 0 2 In determining that distribution and trafficking were
greater offenses that required harsher penalties, Congress made the distinction
that these activities, much more than simple possession, were "such conduct
[that] tends to have the dangerous, unwanted effect of drawing additional participants into the web of drug abuse. 10 3 Thus, where "only individual possession
and use is concerned ..., the Act
prescribes lesser penalties and emphasizes
04
rehabilitation of the drug abuser."'
This intent to distinguish between distributor and user is also found in
the punishments set forth in the Act. As noted above, the Act makes drug distribution a felony, punishable by a minimum of five to ten years imprisonment
with a possible maximum prison sentence of fifteen years. 1°' Simple possession, however, is a misdemeanor that is punishable by not more than one year
imprisonment. 106 In reality, however, imprisonment is unlikely as first-time
offenders convicted of simple possession may receive punishments of probation
and a fine, as well as the possibility of expungment of the sentence. 10 7 This
clear difference in punishment reflects an obvious Congressional recognition
that drug distribution is a far greater crime that requires far harsher penalties
than does simple possession.
With its interpretation of § 843(b) that extends the definition of distribute, the Fourth Circuit Abuelhawa court was at odds with the intent of Congress in passing the Act. By applying § 843(b) to one who purchases drugs for
personal use, the court subjected the buyer to potential punishments that were
far greater than the maximum one year in prison that Congress intended for
"simple possession." Not only is a violation of § 843(b) punishable by up to
four years in prison - four times the maximum penalty for simple possession
- but the statute additionally requires that "[e]ach separate use of a communication facility shall be a separate offense under this subsection."' 1° Thus, using
the Fourth Circuit's logic, a purchaser who makes several telephone calls or
sends several text messages to coordinate a single purchase of drugs can be
found guilty - not of a single misdemeanor conviction punishable by up to one
101

Id. at 449-50 (quoting Act of Oct. 27, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. (84

Stat.) 4566, 4575).
102 Id. (quoting Act of Oct. 27, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. (84 Stat.) 4566,
4570).
103

Id.

104

Id.

105
106

21 U.S.C. § 841 (2008).
21 U.S.C. § 844.

107

Id.

108

21 U.S.C. § 843(b).
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year in prison - but rather of multiple felonies and potentially multiple sentences of up to four years in prison.1 9
Abuelhawa presented the perfect opportunity for the Supreme Court to
eliminate such a harsh and incongruous result. In spite of his insistence that he
was not a drug dealer, Mr. Abuelhawa was charged with seven counts of violating § 843(b) for using a telephone to arrange two separate meetings to purchase
narcotics.' 10 Under the appropriate interpretation, Mr. Abuelhawa should have
faced a maximum of two years imprisonment for two misdemeanor counts of
simple possession under § 844.111 However, under the Fourth Circuit's expanded "facilitation camp" definition, Mr. Abuelhawa was instead subject to
seven felony convictions that could ultimately lead to a possible twenty-eight
years in prison. This type of severe punishment for petty drug users was clearly
at odds with the Congressional intent to value and promote rehabilitation over
retribution, 112 and Justice Souter's
opinion reflected that idea, finding such a
'1 3
believe."
to
"impossible
disparity
Furthermore, it was unlikely that the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of §
843(b) could be harmonized with Congress's intent to limit the statute's reach to
only the facilitation of drug felonies, not the facilitation of drug misdemeanors.
When a buyer uses a communication facility to make a drug purchase for personal use, he should be seen, if following the Congressional purpose of the Act,
as merely facilitating the simple possession of drugs for personal use - a misdemeanor.' 4 However, under the Fourth Circuit's analysis, any buyer of drugs
for personal use also facilitated the seller's felony distribution of drugs when he
or she facilitated their own misdemeanor purchase of drugs." 5 This addition of
a separate, more serious crime would seem to circumvent and frustrate
Con1 16
gress's intent to remove drug misdemeanors from the scope of § 843(b).
109

Id.

110 United States v. Abuelhawa, 523 F.3d 415, 418-19 (4th Cir. 2008).
H]
112

21 U.S.C. § 844.
See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 1444 at 4575, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (finding:
Drug users who violate the law by small purchases or sales should be made to
recognize what society demands of them. In these instances, penalties should
be applied according to the principles of our present code ofjustice. When the

penalties involve imprisonment, however, the rehabilitation of the individual,
rather than retributive punishment should be the major objective.
Id.).
113 Abuelhawa v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 2102, 2107 (2009).
114 21 U.S.C. § 844.
115 Abuelhawa, 523 F.3d at 421.
116

See H.R. Rep. No. 1444 at 4570 (concluding:

The bill revises the entire structure of criminal penalties involving controlled
drugs by providing a consistent method of treatment of all persons accused of
violations. With one exception involving continuing criminal enterprises, hereafter discussed, all mandatory minimum sentences are eliminated. Possession of controlled drugs is made a misdemeanor, except where the possession
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As reflected by the evolution of U.S. drug laws, Congress has continually expressed a desire to limit the punishment of personal users to misdemeanor
charges while saving felony charges for distributors and traffickers. As noted
above, U.S. drug laws prior to the Act, including the previous version of §
843(b), did not confine the scope of facilitation to only drug felonies, but rather
expanded violations to include an act by the buyer in using a communication
facility to facilitate "any act or acts constituting an offense" under the drug
laws.1 17 This law covered all drug crimes, which could include both drug distributors and small-time buyers for personal use, as felonies because all drug
"offense[s]" were considered felonies.'"8
Accordingly, when Congress amended the federal drug laws in the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 ("CSA"), it greatly reduced the scope of this
overly-inclusive category.' 19 As in other areas of the revised drug law, the new
regulations drew a firm distinction between drug distributors and drug users
through the creation of a new category: the misdemeanor offense of simple possession that carried a lesser punishment for possession of drugs for personal
use. 12 This considerable modification by the CSA was regarded by one repre12 1
sentative as "[o]ne of the most striking features of the new penalty structure.
Continuing this trend, Congress also narrowed the scope of the communication
facility provision of the CSA by prohibiting facilitation only with the finding of
a drug "felony," not any drug "offense" as previously required. 122 The Act thus
is for the purpose of distribution to others. In the case of a first offense of
simple possession, the court may place the offender on probation for not more
than [one] year."
Id.).

Narcotics Control Act § 201, 70 Stat. 567. 573 (codified at former 18 U.S.C. § 1403) (repealed Pub. L. 91-513. Title l11. § 1101(b) (1) (A), Oct. 27, 1970, 84 Stat. 1292):
(a) Whoever uses any communication facility in committing or in causing or
facilitating the commission of, or in attempting to commit, any acts or acts
constituting an offense ... shall be imprisoned not less than two and not more
than five years. and, in addition. may be fined not more than $5.000. Each
separate use of a communication facility shall be a separate offense under this
section.
117

(emphasis added).
118
See id.; see also 26 U.S.C. § 7237, 70 Stat. 7237(a) (repealed) ("Whoever commits an of-

fense, or conspires to commit an offense ... shall be imprisoned not less than [two] or more than
[ten] years.").
119
120
121

Pub. L. No. 91-513, Tit. 1I, § 404(a) 84 Stat. 1236, 1264.
Id. (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 844(a)).
116 Cong. Rec. H33316 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1970) (Statement of Rep. Boland):

One of the most striking features of the new penalty structure is that illegal
This
section on simple possession violations reflects the judgment of most authorities that harsh penalties imposed on the user have little deterrent value and often ruin the life of an individual involved.
possession of a controlled drug for one's own use is a misdemeanor ....

122

CSA § 403(b), 84 Stat. at 1263 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 843 (b)).
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reduced possession for personal use to a misdemeanor and made the purchase of
drugs with a communication device for personal use outside the reach of §
843(b) as this section only pertains to felonies. 23 Consequently, the Fourth
Circuit's interpretation of Mr. Abuelhawa's purchase of drugs for personal use
as a felony had the effect of frustrating Congress's intent to limit the scope of §
843(b) to simply the facilitation of a drug "felony." In spite of the Fourth Circuit's claim that Abuelhawa did not "prove that our result is 'demonstrably at
odds' with congressional intent,, 124 the Supreme Court correctly found that
"Congress meant to treat purchasing drugs for personal use more leniently than
felony distribution, and to narrow the scope of the communications provision to
cover only those who facilitate a felony."' 125 To find the opposite, in the opinion
of the Court, would mean that Congress "would for all practical purposes simultaneously have graded back up to felony status with the left hand the same offense .. .it had dropped to a misdemeanor with the right."' 126 This, as Justice
Souter rightly found, would be "impossible to believe. 1 27
V.

ANALOGOUS CASES

While not explicitly mentioned in its opinion in United States v. Abuelhawa, the Supreme Court likely looked to several previous analogous decisions of
the Court to determine how to interpret the term "facilitate" as it relates to §
843(b). In Rewis v. United States, the Supreme Court considered a case in
which the petitioners challenged their convictions under the Travel Act of 1952
("Travel Act"). 28 The Travel Act, dealing with illegal gambling, prohibited
"interstate travel with intent to 'promote, manage, establish, carry on or facilitate' certain kinds of illegal activity."' 129 In determining whether the customers
123

Id.

124

United States v. Abuelhawa, 523 F.3d 415, 421 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v.

Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235. 242 (1989)).
125
Abuelhawa v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 2102. 2103 (2009).
126

Id. at 2104.

127

Id.

128

401 U.S. 808, 809 (1971).

129 Id. at 811 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1964 ed. and Supp. V)), providing:
(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses any facility in
interstate or foreign commerce, including the mail, with intent to
(1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity; or
(2) commit any crime of violence to further any unlawful activity; or
(3) otherwise promote. manage. establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion. management, establishment, or carrying on, of any unlawful activity,
and thereafter performs or attempts to perform any of the acts specified in
subparagraphs (1), (2), and (3), shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
(b) As used in this section (i) 'unlawful activity' means (1) any business enterprise involving gambling, liquor on which the Federal excise tax has not
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of an illegal gambling enterprise "facilitate[d]" that enterprise through mere
participation, the Court looked to the statute and Congressional intent.1 30 Concluding that the Travel Act was not primarily aimed at the defendants,' 3' the
Court held that gamblers at an illegal gambling establishment were not guilty of
"facilitating" the establishment merely through participation. 13 2 The Court emphasized that "the ordinary meaning of this language suggests that the traveler's
purpose must involve more than the desire to patronize the illegal activity. ' I
Because Congress had not intended the Travel Act to "apply to criminal activity
solely because that activity is at times patronized by persons," the Court found
that "neither statutory language nor legislative history supports such a broadranging interpretation .... ,
Therefore, it stands to reason that, as found by
the Ninth Circuit in Martin, "a mere customer" cannot "facilitate the business he
patronize[s] .
In addition to the definition of "facilitate" as used in the Travel Act, the
Court likely reviewed its previous ruling in Smith v. City of Jackson in crafting a
definition of the term as it is used in § 843(b). In City of Jackson, a case involving issues linking Title VII claims with the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, the Court noted that "when Congress uses the same language in two statutes having similar purposes, particularly when one is enacted shortly after the
other, it is appropriate to presume that Congress intended that text to have the
same meaning in both statutes."' 136 As the criminal provisions of the Travel Act
can be seen as analogous to the criminal provisions of the federal drug laws, it
should make no difference that the two statutes address different crimes. As

130

131

been paid, narcotics, or prostitution offenses in violation of the laws of the
State in which they are committed or of the United States, or (2) extortion.
bribery, or arson in violation of the laws of the State in which committed or of
the United States.
Rewis, 401 U.S. at 811 12.
Id. (stating "legislative history of the Act is limited, but does reveal that § 1952 was aimed

primarily at organized crime and, more specifically, at persons who reside in one State while

operating or managing illegal activities located in another."): see S. REP. No. 644, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess., at 2 3. July 27, 1961 (stating:
The target clearly is organized crime. The travel that would be banned is travel 'infurtherance of a business enterprise' which involves gambling, liquor,

narcotics, and prostitution offenses or extortion or bribery. Obviously, we are
not trying to curtail the sporadic. casual involvement in these offenses, but rather a continuous course of conduct sufficient for it to be termed a business
enterprise.
Id).
132

Rewis, 401 U.S. at 811.

133

Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 811 (1971).

134
135

136

Id. at 812.
United States v. Martin, 599 F.2d 880, 888 (9th Cir. 1979).
Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005) (citing Northcross v. Board of Ed. of

Memphis City Schools, 412 U.S. 427. 428 (1973) (per curiam)).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2010

19

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 112, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 11
1042

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 112

stated in Martin, "[a] difference in the nature of the illicit business should not
change the basic principle enunciated by the Supreme Court ...that a mere
customer's contribution to the business he patronizes does not constitute the
facilitation envisioned by Congress." 13' Thus, it would have been reasonable
for the Court to find that, just as the gambling patrons in Rewis did not "facilitate" an illegal gambling establishment within the meaning of the Travel Act
through mere participation, a buyer of illegal drugs for personal use does not
"facilitate" his dealer's drug distribution within the meaning of § 843(b).
VI.

IMPORTANCE

The Supreme Court's review of the Fourth Circuit's decision in the Abuelhawa case - holding that, although the acquisition of illegal drugs for personal use is commonly a misdemeanor under the federal drug laws, any buyer
who uses a "communication facility" to buy the drugs may be charged with a
felony for facilitating the seller's commission of felony distribution - was of
vital importance to several areas of the law.1 38 Because this definition could
have potentially affected countless defendants in criminal drug prosecutions, a
definitive interpretation of § 843(b) by the Supreme Court was necessary to
resolve the split found in the circuits.
The importance of this decision is also found in its potential impact on
individual defendants and the unintended consequences that would have followed those defendants if the Court followed the Fourth Circuit's interpretation.
When Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act of 1970, it sought to make a "sharp distinction" between drug users and
drug distributors. 139 In its decision, the Fourth Circuit Abuelhawa Court ignored an important distinction that was intended by Congress. By elevating
personal drug users from misdemeanants to felons simply because of the use of
a telephone, text-message, or e-mail - rather than face-to-face contact - the
Fourth Circuit elevated form over substance. The severe transformation from
simple misdemeanor to felony was unjustifiably penal. As mentioned previously, there was a serious discrepancy in potential punishment, with a felony meriting significantly harsher prison sentences than a misdemeanor; 4 0 however, there
were also several collateral consequences that affect a defendant who is guilty
of a felony.
Criminals who are convicted as felons, rather than as misdemeanants,
can lose several rights that are extremely important in American society. As a
convicted felon, a defendant will most likely lose the right to vote, depending

137

Martin, 599 F.2d at 888 89.

138

United States v. Abuelhawa, 523 F.3d 415 (4th Cir. 2008); see also infra Part VI for areas of

importance.
139
140

Martin, 599 F.2d at 889.
21 U.S.C. § 843(d)(1).
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upon where they live. 14 1 While disenfranchisement varies depending on how

long ago a defendant was convicted, many states still block a felon's access to
the polls even after release from prison and a probationary period. Virtually all
42
states require that felons serving prison sentences forfeit their right to vote.

Convicted felons released from prison and on parole fare slightly better as they
are unable to vote in only thirty-two states, "while twenty-nine states disenfranchise those on probation."' 143 Additionally, fourteen states continue to prevent
ex-felons from voting even after they have served their full sentence and have
completed any parole or probation period. 144 This barring of ex-felons from
exercising the right to vote effectively disenfranchises these defendants
for life,
5
depriving them of one of a citizen's most fundamental rights.
Conviction of a felony that is punishable by imprisonment for more than
one year would also affect several other rights held dear by citizens. Convicted
felons are disqualified from being able to serve on a federal jury for life, 146 they
might be unable enlist in the armed forces,1 47 they can be evicted from public
housing, 148 they can be permanently barred from receiving food stamps and othSee infra notes 142 146 and accompanying text.
142 Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Abuelhawa 2008 WL 4263550, 13 (No. 08-192) (citing JAMIE FELLHER & MARC
141

MAUER, LOSING THE VOTE, THE IMPACT OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED

STATES, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH AND THE SENTENCING PROJECT, Table 1 (1998). available at
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/vote/ (The report finds incarcerated felons lose the right to
vote in forty-six States and the District of Columbia. Only "[four states (Maine, Massachusetts,
Utah, Vermont) do not disenfranchise convicted felons.")).
Id.
144 Id.; see FELLHER & MAUER, supra note 142, at Part II:
143

[I]n fourteen states, ex-offenders who have fully served their sentences nonetheless remain disenfranchised. Ten of these states disenfranchise ex-felons
for life: Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nevada,
New Mexico, Virginia, and Wyoming. Arizona and Maryland disenfranchise
permanently those convicted of a second felony; and Tennessee and Washington disenfranchise permanently those convicted prior to 1986 and 1984, respectively. In addition, in Texas, a convicted felon's right to vote is not restored until two years after discharge from prison, probation or parole.
Id.
145

Id.

Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(5)).
Id. (citing 10 U.S.C. § 504(a) (finding: "No person who is insane, intoxicated, or a deserter
from an armed force, or who has been convicted of a felony, may be enlisted in any armed force.
However, the Secretary concerned may authorize exceptions. in meritorious cases, for the enlistment of deserters and persons convicted of felonies.")).
148 Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 142, at 14 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (d)(1)(B)(iii), stating:
146

147

during the term of the lease, any criminal activity that threatens the health,
safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other tenants, any

criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of their residences by persons residing in the immediate vicinity of the
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er Social Security benefits, 149 and their property may be subject to forfeiture. 50
In addition, although a convicted felon cannot be excluded from public employment, the felony can be "a factor in determining suitability for it."''
Furthermore, if the defendant is not a citizen, but rather a permanent
resident alien, as was the defendant in Abuelhawa, the difference between a
misdemeanor and a felony is even more important. For a legal permanent resident, a felony conviction under § 843(b) would be considered an aggravated
felony under U.S. immigration law. 1 52 Conviction of this type of felony would
1 53
then immediately make the alien subject to deportation from the United States
with no opportunity to petition the government for a discretionary cancellation
of removal which could stay his deportation. 154 If convicted of a misdemeanor,
however, neither of these sanctions would apply to the resident alien.1 55 Thus,
this transformation of a misdemeanor into a felony would not only have taken
away several important rights related to living in the United States, it could have
also taken away the ability to remain in the country at all.

premises, or any drug-related criminal activity on or near such premises, engaged in by a tenant of any unit, any member of the tenant's household, or any
guest or other person under the tenant's control, shall be cause for termination
of tenancy ....
Id).
149

Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 862a).
150 Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7):

The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property right shall exist in them: ... All real property, including any right, title, and
interest (including any leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of
land and any appurtenances or improvements, which is used, or intended to be
used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a
violation of this subchapter punishable by more than one year's imprisonment.
Id.).
151

Id. at 13.
152 8 U.S.C § 1 101(a)(43)(B) (aggravated felony definition): see Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S.
47 (2006).
153 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2008) ("Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony
at any time after admission is deportable.").
154
8 U.S.C. § 1229b (a)(3) (requirements for cancellation of removal proceedings).
155 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2008) (finding deportable criminal offenses to be (i) crimes of moral
turpitude, (ii) multiple criminal convictions, (iii) aggravated felonies, (iv) high speed flight, and
(v) failure to register as a sex offender).
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VII. FURTHER POLICY ARGUMENTS AGAINST FINDING FOR THE FOURTH
CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION OF ABUELHA WA

A.

Rehabilitation

If the Supreme Court would have followed the Fourth Circuit's decision
in Abuelhawa, it would have run counter to Congress's intent to foster rehabilitation of lesser criminals. In the legislative history of the Act, Congress recited
that "rehabilitation is the humanitarian ideal, to be sought whenever possible. 1 In stating its philosophy for rehabilitating drug users, Congress noted
that "the individual abuser should be rehabilitated" because "drug users who
violate the law by small purchases or sales should be made to recognize what
society demands of them."' 15 For small-time purchasers this would likely not
include long sentences of imprisonment as the "penalties [should] fit offenders
as well as offenses" and "should be designed to permit the offender's rehabilitation wherever possible."' 158 Although the proper emphasis should favor treatment rather than punishment, incarceration often prolongs recovery from drug
abuse and can exacerbate the pre-existing condition.15 9 This philosophy has
helped many state governments recognize the negative impact of a jail sentence
on petty drug purchasers and led at least seventeen states to roll "back mandatory minimum sentences and similar harsh penalties for nonviolent offenders, particularly individuals convicted of drug offenses."'160 Through its conflation of
the drug seller and the drug user, reliance on the Fourth Circuit's decision would
156 H.R. REP. No. 91-1444, reprintedin 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4574.

157

Id. at 4575. (General Philosophy of the Commission:
(1) The illegal traffic in drugs should be attacked with the full power of the
Federal Government. The price for participation in this traffic should be prohibitive. It should be made too dangerous to be attractive.
(2) The individual abuser should be rehabilitated. Every possible effort
should be exerted by all governments
federal, state, and local
and by
every community toward this end. Where necessary to protect society. this
may have to be done at times against the abuser's will. Pertinent to all, the
causes of drug abuse must be found and eradicated.
(3) Drug users who violate the law by small purchases or sales should be
made to recognize what society demands of them. In these instances, penalties
should be applied according to the principles of our present code of justice.
When the penalties involve imprisonment, however, the rehabilitation of the
individual, rather than retributive punishment should be the major objective.

Id.).
158

Id.

159

Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Support-

ing Petitioner, supra note 142, at 14.
160 Id. at 15 (citing SCOTT EHLERS & JASON ZIEDENBERG, PROPOSITION 36: FIvE YEARS LATER,
JUSTICE POLICY INSTITUTE 1 (2006), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/06-

04_REPCAProp36FiveYearsLater DP-AC.pdf).
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have undermined Congress's intent to reform and rehabilitate the lesser offender. Confining petty drug users "in prison with hardened criminals and drug traffickers for a potentially extended period of time is simply counterproductive
where the goal is reformation and reintegration into society." 161 But, this isexactly what the Fourth Circuit Abuelhawa court's interpretation of § 843(b)
would have achieved.
B.

Technological Advances

Furthermore, the issue of the interpretation of § 843(b) is increasingly
important as the use of cellular phones, text messaging, and e-mail continues to
rapidly increase throughout the world. Since 2003, the number of mobile wireless telephone subscribers has increased by almost 100 million people. 162 The
percentage of e-mail and Internet users is also continually on the rise from year
164
to year163 as people are spending more and more time connected to the web.
The most considerable advancement in the field of communication facilities,
however, must be text messaging. Nearly unheard of until the late 1990s, text
messaging has exploded in the United States as the preferred method of communication for young Americans. 65 According to the Cellular Telephone Industry Association, "Americans sent 57.2 billion text messages in 2005, and
now send more than ten times that amount - about 600.5 billion text messages

161

Id.

162

Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Support-

ing Petitioner. supra note 142. at 8 (Comparing FED. COMMC'N. COMM'N.. INDUSTRY ANALYSIS
AND TECHNOLOGY DIVISION, WIRELINE COMPETITION BUREAU, TRENDS IN TELEPHONE SERVICE,

Chart 11.1 (2008), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs public/attachmatch/DOC284932Al.pdf (241,834,000 subscribers per Form 502), with FED. COMMC'N. COMM'N., INDUSTRY
ANALYSIS AND TECHNOLOGY DIVISION, WIRELINE COMPETITION BUREAU, TRENDS IN TELEPHONE

Table
11.1
(2003),
available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common
Carrier/Reports/FCC-StateLink/IAD/trend8O3.pdf(141,776.000 subscribers per Form 502)).
SERVICE,
163

Mary Madden, Internet Penetration and impact,PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT,

Apr. 26, 2006, http://www.pewinternet.org/PPF/r/182/report display.asp (finding surveys showing that 7 3% of respondents (about 147 million adults) are Internet users, up from 66% (about 133
million adults) in January 2005 survey).
164 Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 142, at 8 n.4 (noting "[o]n average, Americans now spend 26 hours and
26 minutes per month using the Internet." Gary Holmes. The Nielsen Company, Nielsen Reports
T,

Internet

and Mobile

Usage

Among

Americans.

July

8.

2008,

available

at

http://www.nielsenmedia.com/nc/portal/site/Public/menuitem.55dc65b4a7d5adff3f65936147aO62
a0/?allRmCB on&newSearch yes&vgnextoid fe63c9769fcfal10VgnVCM100000ac0a260aRCR
D&searchBox=la#).
165 Sarah Perez, Gmail Preferred by Students but Nothing Beats Texting, READWRITEWEB.,
Dec. 12, 2008, http://www.readwriteweb.com/archives/gmailpreferred by students but nothing
_beats texting.php.
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a year."' 166 Many of these messages are sent and received by people under
the age of thirty. 6 7 This popularity makes it increasingly more likely in this
digital age that a petty drug purchaser will not contact a drug distributor in person, but rather through e-mail or text messaging. By utilizing this rapidly growing technology to make the purchase, the buyer would have, under the Fourth
Circuit's interpretation, been committing a felony. It makes little sense why the
buyer "who obtains a personal-use quantity of drugs" by inquiring face-to-face
with a distributor "should be guilty of a misdemeanor, while the person who
texts the same inquiry" is guilty of a felony. 168 This nonsensical distinction
would seem to suggest that Congress - in increasing the punishment whenever
someone uses a communication facility - somehow sees a lesser offense in
buyers who make face-to-face drug transactions in open air markets.1 69 As this
is obviously not the case, it would have been extremely difficult for the Court to
follow a court's interpretation that, in its practice, would "favor[] street-dealing
over electronic communications .... 7
C.

FederalProsecutors

In addition to affecting defendants charged with purchasing drugs, adherence to the Fourth Circuit's expansive interpretation would have also affected federal prosecutors who are charged with prosecuting these defendants.
As employees of the government, federal prosecutors are subject to the current
philosophy and direction of the Attorney General and the United States Department of Justice. At the time of the decision, the Department of Justice instructed prosecutors to "charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable
offense or offenses that are supported by the facts of [a given] case .. .,.
This mandate to pursue the greatest possible offense in every case, regardless of
Congressional intent, would further promote the felony prosecution of petty
drug purchasers. Going against the intent of Congress, an expansive interpretation of § 843(b) would have diverted "prosecutorial resources" from the intended purpose of targeting traffickers and distributors to that of attempting to
166

Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae Support-

ing Petitioner, supra note 142, at 7 (citing CTIA. CTIA Wireless Quick Facts, available at
http://www.ctia.org/media/industry info/index.cfm/AID/10323 (last visited Mar. 2, 2010)).

167 Id. at 9 n.6 ("As of 2006, 65% of people ages 18 29 used their cell phones for text messaging, compared with 37% of people ages 30-49, 13% of people ages 50-64, and 8% of people 65
and

older."

http://www.pewinternet.org/-/media//Files/Reports/2006/PIP

Cellphone study

.pdf.pdf (last visited March 15, 2010)).
168 Id. at 10.
169 Id. at 18.
170 Id. at 19.
171 Brief of the Center on the Administration of Criminal Law as Amicus Curiae in Support of
the Petitioner, Abuelhawa, 2008 WL 4279342, 17 18 (No. 08-192) (Sept. 15. 2008) (quoting
Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft, to All Federal Prosecutors, at 2 (Sept. 22,
2003). available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm).
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fully prosecute the larger, yet significantly less dangerous petty drug users.12
Additionally, given the widespread use of cellular phones and other "communication devices," it is likely that "virtually every possessor will, in connection
with his or her purchase of the drugs (as well in virtually all other aspects of
life), use some type of communication facility.""1 3 This would have required
prosecutors to bring harsher felony charges under § 843(b) against every participant in the drug sale, petty buyer and distributor alike, 114 and would have completely "eviscerat[ed] the distinction between such offenders that is embedded in
the statute intended by Congress. 17 5
Moreover, because of this skewed interpretation of § 843(b), prosecutors would have had excessive and unwarranted power in the plea bargaining
process.176 As it is common for federal criminal charges to be resolved through
a guilty plea,177 it is important that the system remains fair for both sides to determine the proper punishment.1 8 By requiring the harshest possible penalty,
the Fourth Circuit's interpretation would have placed "the specter of a felony
conviction and a substantially lengthier term of incarceration over a drug possessor's head" and, thus, given "prosecutors an enormous and unwarranted
amount of leverage in plea negotiations with defendants charged with possessing drugs" for personal use. 17 9 The prosecutor would have been able to fundamentally change the balance of power in the relationship as the defendant would
now face the possibility of up to four years imprisonment if convicted at trial for
each phone call or text message.
This likely would have led to personal-use
defendants being charged under § 843(b) and forced to plead guilty, when they
otherwise may have been acquitted at trial because they are "faced with a 400%
harsher punishment upon a loss at trial .. ,,.181 Although these inequities always exist when a defendant pleads guilty prior to trial, the Fourth Circuit's
interpretation would have had the outcome of rendering "the dramatically higher
penalty facing a possessor.., increases this risk and places a thumb on the scale
in favor of a plea."' 8 2 Because this inequity would have given federal prosecu172
173

Id. at 17-18.
Id. at 18.

176

Id. at 18 19.
Id.at 19.
Id. at 19 20.

177

Id. at 19 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, COMPENDIUM OF

174

175

FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS (2004). availableat http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/
cfj s04.pdf).

178 Id. at 19; see Wright v. Van Patten 552 U.S. 120. 128 (2008) (Stevens. J. concurring) (acknowledging that "plea bargaining [is] the norm and trial the exception").
179 Brief of the Center on the Administration of Criminal Law as Amicus Curiae in Support of
the Petitioner, supra note 171. at 20.
180

Id.

181

Id.at 21.
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tors the authority to seek harsher charges and convictions for those unintended
by Congress in the enactment of § 843(b), the reasoning of the Abuelhawa court
was rightly rejected by the Supreme Court.
VIII.

MODERN TRENDS OF THE COURT WHEN DECIDING DRUG CASES

Although the Supreme Court, since 2006, has mostly been characterized
as a conservative court, l1 3 several rulings by the 2007 Court hinted that the
Court would find the Fourth Circuit's overly harsh definition of § 843(b) to be
unpersuasive. In December 2007, the Court handed down rulings in two cases
that gave federal judges greater authority to set sentences for crack cocaine
crimes below the range of punishment set by federal guidelines. In Kimbrough
v. U.S., the Court ruled 7-2 that the federal sentencing guidelines for cocaine
violations were only advisory. l 4 The Court found that, although federal judges
must always consider the Congressionally-designed guideline scale for a cocaine violation, they may also determine that the guideline's punishment would
be too harsh for the crime committed.18 5 This allows trial judges to have some
18 6
discretion in choosing the appropriate punishment for certain drug purchasers.
As stated by Justice Ginsburg, the statute "mandates only maximum and minimum sentences" but "says nothing about appropriate sentences within these
brackets, and this Court declines to read any implicit directive into the congressional silence."' 817 This ruling gives judges considerable freedom to disagree
with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines' considerably more severe suggestions
of punishments.
A second case decided in 2007, Gall v. U.S., also granted judges considerable discretion in dealing with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.'"8 In this
case, the Court found - also by a 7-2 margin - that federal judges could impose sentences below the range specified in the guidelines and still have the
punishment regarded as "reasonable."'8 9 This decision overruled an Eighth Circuit decision that found that a below-Guidelines sentence would be reasonable
only if justified by "extraordinary circumstances."1 90 Finding that while "the
Guidelines are the starting point and the initial benchmark," Justice Stevens
wrote that they "are not the only consideration."' 9 1 "Accordingly, after giving
182

Id.

183 Robert Barnes. Supreme Court Leans Conservative, WASH. POST. June 25, 2007. at A3.
184 Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007).
185

Id.

186

Id.

Id.at 102-03.
188 Gall v.United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
187

189

Id. at 41.

190 Gall v. United States, 446 F.3d 884 (8th Cir. 2007), rev'd, 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
191

Gall. 552 U.S. at 39.
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both parties an opportunity to argue for whatever sentence they deem appropriate, the district judge should then consider all of the § 3553(a) factors to determine whether they support the sentence requested by a party."' 92 If the judge
then decides "that an outside Guidelines sentence is warranted, he must consider
the extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance., 1, 93 "Regardless of whether the
sentence imposed is inside or outside the Guidelines range," the Court found,
"the appellate court must review the sentence under an abuse-of-discretion standard."1 94 With this review standard, however, "it is not for the Court of Appeals
to decide de novo whether the justification for a variance is sufficient or the
sentence reasonable. On abuse-of-discretion review, the Court of Appeals
should have given due deference to the District Court's reasoned and reasonable
decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on the whole, justified the sentence."', 95 This
case also provides a broader context for how judges in drug cases may alter sentencing as Gall dealt with whether any federal sentence that falls below the Federal Sentencing Guidelines was valid if it was not supported by "extraordinary
circumstances." 96 This 2007 position that a drug sentence should be "reasoned
and reasonable"1 97 depending on certain factors likely cautioned the Supreme
Court from endorsing the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of § 843(b), which
would have severely increased punishments for petty drug offenders. The
192

Id. at 49 50; see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) listing seven factors that a sentencing court must

consider. The first factor is a broad command to consider "the nature and circumstances of the
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). The second
factor requires the consideration of the general purposes of sentencing, including:
the need for the sentence imposed (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law,
and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.
§ 3553(a)(2). The third factor pertains to "the kinds of sentences available," § 3553(a)(3); the
fourth to the Sentencing Guidelines the fifth to any relevant policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission; the sixth to "the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities," §
3553(a)(6); and the seventh to "the need to provide restitution to any victim," § 3553(a)(7). Preceding this list is a general directive to "impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes" of sentencing described in the second factor. § 3553(a). The
fact that § 3553(a) explicitly directs sentencing courts to consider the Guidelines supports the
premise that district courts must begin their analysis with the Guidelines and remain cognizant of
them throughout the sentencing process.
193 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007).
194

Id. at 51.

195

Id. at 59 60.

196

Id. at 47.

197

Id. at 59 60.
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Court, through these decisions, has now made it clear that reasonableness must
be factored into the equation when interpreting statutes. Like these drug decisions involving the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the Court's decision in Abuelhawa also counsels that all drug sentences should be "reasoned and reasonable." 198 Any movement against this trend would be in stark contrast to the stated
Congressional intent of the statute and "would skew the calibration of penalties
very substantially."' 99
IX. CONCLUSION

As shown above, the Fourth Circuit's § 843(b) decision in Abuelhawa
that personal drug users who use a communication device to make a purchase
have committed a drug felony, rather than a drug misdemeanor, failed to recognize the intent of Congress and the reasoning and public policy values reflected
in previous decisions of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court recognized
these facts and made the correct decision in rejecting the Fourth Circuit's analysis. Although any suggestion of leniency in drug cases can be politically unpopular as neither the Court nor Congress wish to be viewed as soft on drug
crimes, Congress has chosen to make a distinction between the types of drug
users who should be prosecuted more harshly than others. With this distinction,
drug dealers have been determined to be more of a danger to society than personal drug users and, thus, subject to a felony charge rather than a misdemeanor.
If the Supreme Court would have followed the Fourth Circuit's interpretation,
this distinction would have evaporated as, in our modern times, nearly all drug
purchases are facilitated by a communication device, and, consequently, all personal-use drug buyers can be charged with felonies, rather than misdemeanors.
In its decision, the Supreme Court looked to the explicit intent of Congress in
the passing of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act and
found that the Fourth Circuit's Abuelhawa interpretation of § 843(b) was overbroad and should not be applied to a person who is only purchasing drugs solely
for personal use. To200find otherwise, as written by Justice Souter, would be "impossible to believe.,
C. William Ralston*

198

199
200

Id. at 59 60.
Abuelhawa v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 2102, 2106 (2009).
Id. at 2107.
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